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a marathon environmental litigation: Seventeen 
yearS anD Counting
The last time the environmental lawsuit Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco was discussed in these pages, the defen-dant Chevron Corporation1 had just won a forum non 
conveniens dismissal of the case from a U.S. federal court to 
Ecuador after nine years of litigation. Filed in 1993, the lawsuit 
alleged that Chevron’s predecessor company, Texaco, while it 
exclusively operated several oil fields in Ecuador’s Amazon 
from 1964 to 1990, deliberately dumped billions of gallons of 
toxic waste into the rainforest to cut costs and abandoned more 
than 900 large unlined waste pits that leach toxins into soils 
and groundwater. The suit contended that the contamination 
poisoned an area the size of Rhode Island, created a cancer epi-
demic, and decimated indigenous groups.
During the U.S. stage of the litigation, Chevron submitted 
fourteen sworn affidavits attesting to the fairness and adequacy 
of Ecuador’s courts. The company also drafted a letter that was 
signed by Ecuador’s then ambassador to the United States, a 
former Chevron lawyer, asking the U.S. court to send the case 
to Ecuador.2 Representative of Chevron’s position was the sworn 
statement from Dr. Ponce Martinez, its lead lawyer in Ecuador 
for more than three decades: “In my opinion, based upon my 
knowledge and expertise, the Ecuadorian courts provide a totally 
adequate forum in which these plaintiffs fairly could pursue their 
claims.”3 As a condition of the dismissal, Chevron promised 
to subject itself to jurisdiction in Ecuador for purposes of the 
claims, agreed to abide by any judgment from Ecuador’s courts 
subject only to narrow enforcement defenses in the United 
States, and waived statute of limitations defenses.4 Armed with 
these legally-enforceable commitments, indigenous and farmer 
communities from Ecuador’s Amazon region, along with their 
U.S. and Ecuadorian lawyers, made the bold decision to re-file 
the same tort action in Ecuador’s courts. The communities were 
committed to seeking redress for human rights abuses that have 
decimated indigenous groups and to addressing the broader, 
related questions of accountability and impunity. Therefore, 
they plowed ahead despite deep concern that Chevron, with its 
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vast resources and cadres of loyal and influential operatives in 
Ecuador built up over decades of operations there, would either 
make the case disappear or draw it out endlessly. In 2004, it 
looked as though the case could be an example of how “courts 
have the potential to re-allocate some of the costs of globaliza-
tion — in this case, environmental destruction — from the most 
vulnerable rainforest dwellers to the most powerful energy com-
panies on the planet.” Those words were written in this publica-
tion by one of the authors when assessing the case in 2004, at the 
very beginning of the trial in Ecuador that has yet to conclude.5
The ensuing seven years of environmental litigation in 
Ecuador have been far from easy, raising a number of critical 
legal and policy challenges relating to accountability for human 
rights violations. Most of these challenges stem from Chevron’s 
use of what one observer called a “textbook example of abusive 
litigation” to forestall resolution of pressing legal claims on 
which the survival of thousands of people could depend.6 As 
discussed below, Chevron representatives have repeatedly tried 
to improperly influence the court and apply political pressure to 
coax Ecuador’s government to quash the private lawsuit in viola-
tion of Ecuador’s constitution.7 Evidence suggests the company 
is now violating its commitments to a U.S. federal court about its 
intentions to abide by a judgment in Ecuador.8 Chevron recently 
resorted to using a Nixon-style “dirty tricks” sting operation 
Steven Donziger, attorney for the affected communities, speaks with 
Huaorani women outside the Superior Court at the start of the Chevron 
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designed to undermine the trial and fabricate evidence of judi-
cial misconduct.9
In Ecuador, providing scientific proof has required the 
communities to assemble and manage teams of environmental 
experts to produce reports and counter-reports that collectively 
run into the thousands of pages. The legal side has required just 
as much effort, not only to determine questions of liability but 
also to respond to hundreds of motions filed by Chevron to delay 
the trial over the years. Chevron, having correctly concluded it 
is far cheaper to litigate than to pay the cost of cleaning up an 
area the size of Rhode Island, adopted a simple defense strategy: 
deny, distract, and delay. The company can afford this strategy: it 
made U.S. $25 billion in profit in 2008 alone. The communities 
operate under a more terrifying calculus: more than 1,400 cancer 
deaths due to oil contamination and near-constant exposure to 
cancer-causing oil hydrocarbons, resulting in damages up to U.S. 
$27.3 billion,10 according to a court-appointed Special Master.11
The communities have been buoyed by the fundamental 
strength of the underlying scientific and technical evidence. 
Any visitor to the region can see the prima facie case in strik-
ing terms: old Texaco barrels mired in hundreds of giant, 
unlined, open-air pits of oily sludge that leach their contents via 
pipes built by the oil company into nearby streams and rivers. 
Carcasses of cows and birds can often be seen floating in the 
oil muck at well sites built, operated, and closed — but never 
cleaned — by Texaco. Evidence demonstrates the company 
never conducted a single environmental impact study or health 
evaluation in the decades it operated in the Amazon, even though 
thousands of people lived in and around its oil production facili-
ties and relied on rivers and streams that the company used to 
discharge toxic waste. Hundreds of waste pits left by Texaco 
have been tested extensively by Chevron, the plaintiffs, and 
various third parties, revealing levels of total petroleum hydro-
carbons and heavy metals hundreds and sometimes thousands of 
times higher than allowable norms in Ecuador and the U.S.12 In 
fact, Chevron’s own documents prove that, as the communities 
have long alleged, Texaco never re-injected or safely disposed 
of “produced water,”13 and instead directed it via an elaborate 
system of pipes into surrounding streams and rivers which local 
residents still use for drinking and bathing.14
The communities have successfully rebutted Chevron’s 
defenses as factually false and legally inadequate. For example, 
after Aguinda was filed in 1993, Chevron decided, without con-
sulting with the communities, to remediate a small portion of 
the contaminated sites in exchange for a release from Ecuador’s 
government. The release expressly excludes the private claims 
in Aguinda; yet, as the case was pending in U.S. court, Chevron 
argued that the release covered those claims and that the case 
should be dismissed based on the purported clean-up.15 Though 
the U.S. district court never accepted this argument, Chevron 
still reaps huge public relations benefits and buys years of 
time by litigating the “release” issue repeatedly in various fora 
and using it to claim that the very existence of the lawsuit in 
Ecuador is a violation of its contractual rights. Aside from the 
fact the “release” is not applicable to the claims in Aguinda, 
the clean-up on which it was conditioned appears to have been 
a fraud: samples from both parties in the current trial reveal 
that the “remediated” sites are just as contaminated as ones that 
were never treated.16 Worse, two former Texaco lawyers, both 
now employed by Chevron, are facing criminal fraud charges 
in Ecuador for using a laboratory test that made it impossible to 
detect anything more than trace amounts of toxins in the soils 
at highly contaminated sites at the time the company secured 
the release.17 The results of this test were reported to Ecuador’s 
government to prove the remediation met the required clean-up 
standards.
At trial, Chevron used soil samples lifted far from the con-
taminated areas as proof that its operation had no environmental 
impact, but this tactic was documented by the Special Master. 
Chevron’s technical team reported that it could not detect con-
tamination at waste pits that resembled lakes of oil sludge, such 
as one at a well site called Shushufindi 38. At this site, Chevron 
reported a “no detect” based on a laboratory analysis of a ran-
dom soil sample of dirt lifted from surrounding forest far away 
from the waste pit. This sampling result and others like it were 
used as the basis for a technical report submitted by Chevron 
as evidence to the court that concluded the site posed no risk 
to human health.18 Chevron also claims that the contamination 
is really the fault of the current operator of the oil fields, state-
owned Petroecuador. However, this has proven to be both factu-
ally false, according to company records and field samplings 
that reveal contamination at sites never touched by Petroecuador, 
and legally insufficient, because the concept of joint and several 
liability applies to remediation cases precisely in order to pre-
vent the general public from having to foot the bill to clean up 
contamination that once benefited a polluter.
There have been myriad other obstacles related to Chevron’s 
effort to use its political muscle to terminate the Aguinda case. 
In the United States, the company employs six public relations 
firms and roughly one dozen lobbyists to handle the Ecuador 
issue, leading one Congressperson to accuse the company of 
engaging “in a lobbying effort that looks like little more than 
extortion.”19 The lobbyists, who include former high-level 
Clinton and Bush administration officials, try to influence 
the U.S. government to cancel bilateral trade preferences for 
Ecuador as “punishment” for letting its citizens sue Chevron in 
U.S. courts.20 If Chevron were to succeed, Ecuador’s economy 
would lose approximately 300,000 jobs.21 Public relations firms, 
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including Hill & Knowlton (of tobacco industry fame) and 
Edelman Worldwide, try to quash unfavorable stories, sow doubt 
about scientific evidence, and control the political environment 
to influence judicial decisions and public opinion. Their work 
includes buying advertisements in U.S. and Ecuadorian news-
papers and on websites attacking the Ecuador trial judge, court 
expert, and the plaintiffs’ representatives. The two Ecuadorian 
men who are leading the lawsuit were labeled “environmental 
con men” in a full-page Chevron advertisement in the San 
Francisco Chronicle in 2008, the day before they received the 
prestigious Goldman Environmental Award.22 Chevron also 
makes significant donations to various U.S. non-profit organiza-
tions to provide a platform to press its views on Ecuador. This 
includes providing financial support to the Fund for Peace to set 
up roundtable discussions for Chevron lawyers to opine on how 
the company is being victimized by Ecuador’s court system.23
In Ecuador, Chevron has repeatedly tried to enlist the U.S. 
embassy in Quito to advance its litigation interests and to 
help it dispense with the lawsuit through a separate settlement 
with Ecuador’s government. Chevron signed a contract with 
Ecuador’s army — historically viewed by indigenous groups 
as a hostile force — to provide it private security and housing 
during the trial. At one point, the commander of the base on 
which Chevron’s legal team maintained its office signed a false 
military report, alleging a security threat to the Chevron lawyers 
that delayed a critical court-supervised field inspection for six 
months.24 Chevron has met on a regular basis with Ecuador’s 
presidents during the pendency of the litigation to press its 
position that the case should be dismissed.25 Finally, Amnesty 
International and the International Commission of Jurists have 
noted that attorneys for the Ecuadorian communities have been 
victims of mysterious death threats and robberies.26 Notably, 
Chevron has refused to join these organizations in condemning 
these threats.
On the legal front, Chevron quickly abdicated on its com-
mitments to the U.S. federal court once the evidence pointed to 
its culpability. In 2004, as the Aguinda trial was in full motion, 
Chevron filed a claim against Ecuador’s government before the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) in New York, seeking 
a declaration that it was not liable for further environmental 
clean-up based on the release and ordering Ecuador’s execu-
tive branch to intervene in the case to immunize Chevron from 
any liability.27 The same New York federal court that originally 
dismissed Aguinda to Ecuador soundly rebuked Chevron and 
permanently stayed the arbitration. The Second Circuit denied 
Chevron’s appeal with a unanimous summary order, and the 
Supreme Court denied review even after the company hired 
former U.S. Solicitor Paul Clement to prepare its petition for 
certiorari. 28
Separately, in 2004 Chevron filed an arbitration claim 
against Ecuador under the U.S.-Ecuador Bilaterial Investment 
Treaty (BIT),29 relating to seven lawsuits covering commer-
cial disputes with Petroecuador that were filed in Ecuador 
by Texaco as it was winding down its operations in the early 
1990s. Chevron alleged it was a victim of “denial of justice” in 
Ecuador because the cases had taken almost fifteen years and 
no rulings had issued. The costly and lengthy arbitration over 
these claims, which is now in its fourth year and involves several 
major U.S. law firms, is largely an attempt by Chevron to create 
a “record” that Ecuador’s judicial system is defective to help it 
defeat enforcement of any judgment in the Aguinda case using 
the same argument. In this “Seven Cases” arbitration, Ecuador 
presented evidence that Chevron deliberately delayed each of 
the cases — sometimes working no more than one person-hour 
per year on each case. In 2001, to induce the U.S. federal court 
to move the Aguinda case to Ecuador, Chevron cited the same 
seven cases as evidence of the “fairness and competency” of 
Ecuador’s judiciary. An Ecuadorian trial court recently granted 
Chevron a $1.5 million judgment against Petroecuador in one 
of these cases.30 A decision in the “Seven Cases” arbitration is 
still pending.
Despite these roadblocks, the communities have kept the 
Aguinda trial on track. In 2008, the aforementioned Special 
Master, appointed by the court and accepted by Chevron without 
objection as an expert in a previous part of the case, calculated 
an overall damages figure of U.S. $27.3 billion, roughly equiva-
lent to twenty percent of the company’s market value. The price 
tag, while considerable, is consistent with the clean-up costs 
for other large environmental disasters around the world.31 
Ultimately a judge will decide questions of liability and dam-
ages. Even if the court finds Chevron liable and lowers the 
damages award, something significant is happening in Ecuador: 
some of the world’s most vulnerable indigenous groups and 
rainforest communities are moving ever closer to having their 
human rights claims resolved after years of struggle against one 
of the world’s largest and most influential corporations. Despite 
Chevron’s continued attempts at delay, the trial is nearing the 
submission of closing arguments.
When it became clear that the evidence in the trial against 
Chevron was building and that the company’s multi-pronged 
strategy to extinguish the case was not working, a Chevron 
spokesman announced bluntly to the Wall Street Journal: “We’re 
not paying and we’re going to fight this for years if not decades 
into the future.”32 The company put out a press release promis-
ing the plaintiffs a “lifetime of litigation” if they persisted.33 
Chevron’s General Counsel said he expected to lose the case, but 
vowed that Chevron would “fight until hell freezes over and then 
skate it out on the ice.” These statements clearly contradicted 
Chevron’s earlier promises to abide by a judgment in Ecuador’s 
courts. It became increasingly clear to the plaintiffs that Chevron 
intended to play by a different set of rules. It appeared Chevron 
not only sought to quash the case, but also to kill off the very 
idea that indigenous communities could empower themselves 
to vindicate their legal rights. In a startling moment of candor, 
a Chevron lobbyist interviewed about the lawsuit admitted to 
Newsweek’s Michael Isikoff: “We can’t let little countries screw 
around with big companies like this — companies that have 
made big investments around the world.”34
international arBitration aS a “Star WarS”-Style 
DefenSe againSt human rightS ClaimS
With the mindset expressed by these Chevron officials, 
it becomes understandable how a corporate defense strategy 
can be pushed beyond standard legal and ethical boundaries. 
From the communities’ perspective, this is exactly what hap-
pened. Recently, Chevron launched a maneuver that it believes 
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Although clothed in the elegant language of 
international jurisprudence, Chevron’s underlying 
construct is ominous: a corporation with almost  
limitless resources is using an investment treaty  
as a weapon to engineer a favorable verdict in a  
human rights trial in which it promised to  
participate and satisfy any adverse judgment.
can render the seventeen-year Aguinda trial a pointless exer-
cise. Relying on the 1997 BIT between the United States and 
Ecuador, Chevron in September 2009 initiated a closed-door 
arbitration against the Ecuadorian government claiming it has 
not been treated fairly in the Ecuador trial.35 Chevron argues 
that the release received from Ecuador for its “clean-up” in the 
1990s should absolve it of all liability — even though the release 
expressly excludes private claims of the type being asserted in 
Aguinda and the remedial work on which it is based appears 
to have been fraudulent. Chevron argues that the Ecuador trial 
court, to whose jurisdiction it had agreed to submit when the 
case was in U.S. federal court, erred in not summarily dismissing 
the claims of the plaintiffs based on the release. Chevron already 
had raised the same argument about the release in multiple pub-
lic courts and failed to prevail: the U.S. court in the early years 
of the case, the Ecuadorian court in the Aguinda trial where a 
decision is pending, and the aforementioned litigation in U.S. 
federal court over Chevron’s right to the AAA arbitration against 
Ecuador that was permanently stayed. In this latter proceeding, 
Chevron had hastily withdrawn the same claim regarding the 
release after the U.S. federal judge said it was “highly unlikely” 
it would prevail on the issue. 36
In this latest arbitration notification, Chevron seeks to have 
a panel of international jurists — all private citizens not part 
of any public judicial body — issue an order instructing the 
government of Ecuador to mandate that its constitutionally-inde-
pendent courts determine that Chevron is “not liable” despite the 
mountains of scientific and legal evidence in the Aguinda case 
and despite the fact the Aguinda court has yet to rule. Chevron 
is also trying to burrow its way into this forum even though 
it agreed to the dismissal of the Aguinda action in the United 
States with only one reservation to contest a judgment — an 
enforcement action in the United States, where it could present 
the same underlying facts of unfair treatment to try to nullify any 
adverse judgment that it plans to present in the BIT arbitration. 
If Chevron gets its way, the BIT arbitral panel would allow it to 
re-litigate the core claims at issue in the public trial in Ecuador. 
The communities, by arbitration rules, would not have access 
to the proceedings, much less the opportunity to be a party.37 
Chevron’s desired result would effectively strip tens of thou-
sands of people of their legal rights to seek a remedy against the 
perpetrator of what they consider to be an environmental crime 
on their ancestral lands. The arbitral panel would be governed by 
the UNCITRAL rules, which were created under the auspices of 
the United Nations to promote dispute resolution in the context 
of international trade law.38
Although clothed in the elegant language of international 
jurisprudence, Chevron’s underlying construct is ominous: a 
corporation with almost limitless resources is using an invest-
ment treaty as a weapon to engineer a favorable verdict in a 
human rights trial in which it promised to participate and satisfy 
any adverse judgment. It is now trying to use international arbi-
tration to accomplish what it could not through political pressure 
or proceedings in open court. That this process will wreak havoc 
on the rule of law in Ecuador, with negative consequences for 
other foreign investors in the country, appears to make no dif-
ference to Chevron as long as it benefits the company in this 
instance.39
A leading specialist in this area recently noted in a some-
what tinged compliment that Chevron’s claim is “what the state 
of the art looks like” as far as corporations taking on states in 
international arbitration.40 While extreme, Chevron’s maneuver 
is the latest example of a profoundly disturbing trend that could 
have devastating consequences for human rights victims seek-
ing recourse against private actors in the courts of their home 
countries. There are numerous recent examples of multinational 
corporations using the international arbitration system along the 
lines of the Reagan-era “Star Wars Missile Defense” fantasy — a 
shield to deflect the claims of human rights victims being heard 
in national courts around the globe. Under Chevron’s proposed 
construct, the rulings of these private arbitration panels could be 
tailored to trump the rulings of any public court, including the 
highest courts of the countries where the abuses occurred.
In the last two decades, multinational corporations have lined 
up to sue states in ways that raise profound public policy, human 
rights, and environmental concerns. Recently, when El Salvador 
denied Canadian gold mining company Pacific Rim a mining 
permit — after conducting an extensive environmental impact 
assessment — the case wound up at international arbitration 
4
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with El Salvador potentially on the hook for hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars.41 Investors have sued Argentina, Bolivia, and 
Tanzania on claims that raise profound issues with respect to the 
fundamental human right to water;42 insurance companies have 
attacked developing-country plans to institute universal health 
care;43 and a white-owned mining company sued South Africa 
alleging that the country’s internationally-celebrated affirma-
tive action program discriminates against the company.44 For 
smaller or economically disadvantaged countries, these are not 
minor matters: for example, the U.S. $353 million award won by 
American investor Ronald Lauder against the Czech Republic 
for alleged “interference” with his Czech TV business equaled 
the entire national health insurance budget of the country.45
While Chevron’s BIT case is only designed to evade liability 
in Ecuador, the move risks pushing international arbitration in 
a radically expansive direction that could provide an unprec-
edented level of immunity to multinationals. A successful 
human rights or commercial claim against a foreign entity could 
be snatched away by a private court of arbitrators in which the 
party initially bringing suit cannot be heard and has little or no 
recourse. Chevron’s core claim that Ecuador’s entire judicial sys-
tem is broken and therefore denies it due process is a traditional 
human rights claim, yet Chevron is using it to derail a human 
rights litigation involving the deliberate dumping of billions 
of gallons of toxic waste into a local water supply. Chevron is 
asserting that, because of the BIT, its rights as an investor trump 
those of domestic constituencies, here indigenous groups fight-
ing to remedy the despoliation of the ecosystem on which they 
are dependent for their survival.
Whether Chevron’s plan turns out to be “state of the art” is 
dependent on how the landscape of arbitration under investment 
treaties unfolds and whether, as a general matter, domestic courts 
will treat private arbitral awards as barriers to enforcement of 
foreign judgments. Unless this gathering danger is addressed, 
the prospects for future human rights litigation against corpo-
rations like Chevron will face steep new obstacles. Corporate 
defendants facing liability in a domestic human rights proceed-
ing could seek safe haven in a BIT by offering conspiracy theo-
ries that describe a “denial of justice” or a similarly generalized 
claim, allowing an arbitration tribunal to take control and issue 
injunctive orders against the domestic sovereign and its courts.
the gathering Danger of expanSive JuriSDiCtion of 
international arBitral triBunalS
The modern system of investor-state arbitration evolved 
largely out of a much older system of commercial arbitration 
between private companies. Such arbitration, based on con-
tracts between specific parties, was heard by panels consisting 
of lawyers in private practice and non-lawyer professionals in 
the relevant field. It was a “gentlemanly” system of dispute 
resolution: tribunals, as a practical matter, looked to more or 
less any law they wished;46 established facts “by all appropriate 
means;”47 and otherwise acted freely to deliver “arbitral justice” 
as between the parties.48 The modern investor-state system, 
however, lacks the specific consent and clear limitations that 
made the earlier system palatable: BITs are not specific agree-
ments to arbitrate, but generalized offers to arbitrate certain 
classes of disputes against certain investors in a wide range 
of circumstances. Creative lawyering has dragged many states 
into arbitration they never would have considered submitting to 
at the time they signed the BIT. In this “new world of arbitra-
tion,” often called “arbitration without privity,”49 what was once 
“gentlemanly” becomes autocratic, with a tiny elite privately 
working out deals that can deeply affect the well-being of mil-
lions of people and the autonomy of entire nations.
While investor-state tribunals have on rare occasions awarded 
injunctive relief, they are usually limited to orders necessary 
to prevent the secreting away or spoiling of assets. Chevron 
observes no such limitation in its desire that Ecuador’s executive 
branch declare it absolved of all claims in the Aguinda court 
case. Historically, unbounded orders of this sort only flowed 
from the “equity” powers of courts of chancery, which were 
known to provide remedies as necessary to “do justice” in the 
eyes of the sitting magistrate. Though formal chancery is extinct, 
domestic courts that assert such jurisdiction do so only under 
specific constitutional and statutory grounds, which carefully 
circumscribe the degree to which those powers can be exercised.
Another worrying feature of the arbitral panels is that they 
have become a major revenue generator, creating perverse incen-
tives. The estimated two dozen private citizen-arbitrators and the 
numerous lawyers who repeatedly take part in these proceed-
ings consider themselves members of an informal elite circle, 
or to use their words, “The Club.” 50 A typical arbitrator may 
never have visited the country over which he or she will serve 
as de facto judge and jury and likely will have little apprecia-
tion for the policy complexities at stake when the people who 
are often most impacted are not represented before the panel.51 
The arbitrators also have a pronounced personal incentive to 
extend their jurisdiction as widely as reasonably possible given 
that they are paid by the hour and can reap millions of dollars 
in fees from a single matter. 52 Structurally, the panels seem to 
favor well-resourced private investors who can afford the best 
legal talent and disfavor the government lawyers running litiga-
tion for developing nations. Under the inchoate standards that 
govern these proceedings, some arbitrators have ruled in favor 
of investors repeatedly across numerous cases. Since there is no 
database of decisions and little or no public scrutiny, there is no 
system-wide check on any perceived or actual bias. Once a pan-
elist develops a pro-investor reputation grounded in a solid grasp 
of international law, he or she becomes part of a highly coveted 
pool of candidates who are repeatedly appointed. It is virtually 
impossible, given the arbitral rules that govern appointments, 
to have a panel where the majority of arbitrators are outside of 
“The Club.”53 Chevron’s appointed arbitrator in its hoped-for 
BIT case is an example of this phenomenon.54
While the scope of Chevron’s requested relief is likely 
unprecedented, its actual claims appear tenuous at best. Indeed, 
a different tribunal recently rejected a much less sweeping 
request for injunctive relief against Ecuador made by Occidental 
Petroleum. Notably, the tribunal found that injunctive relief could 
be justified only where it was “necessary and urgent” to avoid 
harm that was both “imminent and irreparable.”55 Chevron will 
have several layers of appeal in Ecuador — which it has vowed 
to exhaust56 — where it will still be able to fight enforcement 
and raise the same claims that it is asserting before the BIT tri-
bunal.57 So while having to face judgment in such a high-profile 
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case and answer to an evidentiary record of over 200,000 pages 
may be disconcerting to Chevron, relief is hardly “necessary and 
urgent” as a matter of international law. Nor is there any threat 
of irreparable harm here; a harm is only irreparable if it cannot 
be fully compensated by damages, and damages are all that is at 
issue. Finally, it is unclear whether Chevron was an “investor” 
in Ecuador before the BIT came into force in 1997, since Texaco 
left Ecuador in 1992, a fact which could nullify Chevron’s ability 
to be covered by the treaty and thus block the arbitration.58
The tenuousness of Chevron’s claims, however, should not 
be confused with the viability of its overall strategy. Its purpose 
is to use — or abuse, as the case may be — the opportunity 
afforded by the BIT arbitration to continue to exhaust the 
resources of its adversaries and cast a cloud of confusion over 
the proceeding in Ecuador. Even if Chevron loses the BIT case, 
it is still acting on its threat to pursue a “lifetime of litigation” 
that gains the company years of time and additional profits from 
the monies it could collect on capital that otherwise would be 
used to satisfy a judgment. The arbitration could easily take 
five or more years and consume tens of millions of dollars of 
attorney time for each side, potentially deterring human rights 
litigants from bringing similar cases in countries where Chevron 
has operations implicated in human rights abuses.59 Effectively 
playing international human rights law and international invest-
ment law against one another, the implications of this strategy 
raise profound challenges for both areas of law.60
from Sour grapeS to “Denial of JuStiCe”
Chevron claims that the Ecuador trial has been conducted 
“in total disregard of Ecuadorian law, international standards of 
fairness, and Chevron’s basic due process and natural rights.”61 
The evidence suggests that Chevron is attempting to contrive a 
narrative to undermine the due process rights of the claimants 
in Ecuador to create “evidence” that it can use in a BIT arbitra-
tion or in a later enforcement action. To this end, the company 
has used its lobbyists to convince the U.S. State Department and 
the office of the U.S. Trade Representative to adopt reporting 
language which seems hand-casted by Chevron’s legal team that 
raises doubts about the fairness of Ecuador’s judicial system.62
Chevron’s claim is built largely on a disconnected series of 
innocuous events along with various incidents fashioned by the 
company’s legal team to try to paint a picture of systemic bias. 
The Chevron methodology that allows the company to argue that 
Ecuador’s judicial system is “broken” could make the judiciaries 
of the world’s most robust democracies appear politicized and 
corrupt. Using Chevron’s strategy, one would be able to con-
demn the entire U.S. judiciary by pointing to the fact that U.S. 
judges receive campaign contributions in Texas, a federal judge 
was recently impeached, two judges in Pennsylvania received 
kickbacks by sentencing juveniles to incarceration, seventeen 
judges in Illinois were indicted, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
arbitrarily decided who would be president in Bush v. Gore.63 In 
Ecuador, Chevron has deliberately inundated the trial court with 
repetitive motions that it expects to lose in order to support its 
central theme. The court decisions cited by Chevron to “prove” 
bias in Ecuador all fit well within Ecuadorian and U.S. jurispru-
dence. For example, Chevron as of the time of this writing had 
filed 29 motions to disqualify the Special Master; each one was 
denied by the court. Chevron uses these denials as “evidence” 
of the court’s bias.64 In another example, Chevron cites a 2007 
decision granting the motion of the plaintiffs to withdraw a 
request for judicial inspections of some contaminated well 
sites. The parties inspected 47 sites, including all of the 36 
sites Chevron requested; each site revealed significant toxic 
contamination in soils and water in and around the waste pits. 
Additional inspections would have been redundant and con-
sumed years of time. Given that the plaintiffs had concluded 
that their burden of proof was met, the court granted the 
motion. Chevron has used this issue as a central feature of its 
BIT arbitration claim.
Chevron also claims “political interference” in the trial by 
the Ecuadorian executive branch on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
a claim for which Chevron has not presented a scintilla of 
actual evidence.65 The company cites comments made by 
Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa criticizing environmental 
damage caused when Texaco was the operator of the oil fields. 
However, Chevron fails to mention that, in the same com-
ments, which followed a visit to the region, President Correa 
blasted his own state-owned oil company for causing environ-
mental damage, which arguably helps Chevron’s defense that 
it is not responsible. Heads of state have a right, indeed an 
obligation, to comment on a humanitarian disaster afflicting 
their own citizens even if there is open litigation related to it, 
and many do. Indeed, U.S. Presidents Barack Obama, George 
W. Bush, and Bill Clinton all have commented on ongoing 
litigation as a matter of course, without charges that they are 
interfering with the independence of the judicial branch.66
ConCluSion
Cross-border capital flows can bring important economic 
benefits and jobs to both developed and developing countries; 
in this context, BITs can play a constructive role if designed 
to protect the interests of the public and third parties who 
may be adversely impacted. The question is how to prevent 
the BIT regime from being used to further abusive litigation 
tactics that are predicated on a strategy of forum shopping 
and indefinite delay. Currently BITs do little to guarantee 
procedural or substantive fairness to non-investor litigants. 
What has emerged from thousands of separate BITs is a 
patchwork system with seemingly inscrutable arbitration pro-
visions. Arbitral tribunals operate unchecked with no formal 
public scrutiny, inviting gamesmanship and abuse. Chevron’s 
willingness to play musical jurisdictions, all the while con-
suming the resources of its impoverished adversaries while 
amassing record-breaking profits (fractions of which could 
pay for a clean-up in Ecuador), threatens to turn the Aguinda 
trial into an epic illustration of corporate impunity. Recent 
history shows that citizen-arbitrators have generally been only 
too willing to play along, pushing the system far past where 
states — not to mention third parties whose legal claims are 
being hijacked into forums where they cannot appear — ever 
thought they would or could venture. Moreover, as the link-
ages between investment, development, and human rights 
increasingly emerge, deeper structural problems that cannot 
be papered over are revealed in the BIT arbitral process.
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A decentralized system that includes more than 2,500 bilat-
eral treaties may seem dauntingly hard to reform, but current 
widespread discontent has already stimulated a fair amount 
of thought. Ecuador and Bolivia have withdrawn from the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
the World Bank’s international arbitration arm, and have begun 
formulating an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that 
would address the broader public interest and function more 
predictably and transparently.67 The U.S. State Department has 
begun reviewing and amending the U.S. Model BIT, which 
often serves as the first draft for BITs between non-U.S. parties. 
Changes being considered could add transparency and mecha-
nisms to prevent meritless claims, enhance requirements relat-
ing to exhaustion of domestic remedies, increase protections for 
affected third parties, and perhaps move entirely from an inves-
tor-state to a state-to-state model.68 Likewise, the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development has formulated an entire 
proposed BIT that would address many of these shortcomings.69 
Indeed, even an “international investment court” of the sort pro-
posed by leading academics would go a long way toward clari-
fying the proper jurisdiction of investment disputes, the latitude 
of states to act in the public interest, and the rights available to 
affected third parties.70
What is clear is that none of these proposed reforms goes far 
enough to guarantee fairness to persons in the position of the 
Aguinda plaintiffs. The unusual circumstances and long history 
of the Aguinda matter require the intervention of a U.S. federal 
court to enjoin Chevron from violating its previous representa-
tions that served as the basis for the court to send the case to 
Ecuador’s courts. Accordingly, both the Aguinda plaintiffs and 
Ecuador are seeking such relief now in the very court where the 
case started seventeen years ago.71 In terms of the BIT process, 
the fact Chevron is pushing the envelope so aggressively reveals 
flaws in the arbitration regime that should be corrected. As a 
start, those reforming the BITs might consider a bright-line rule 
that prohibits an investor who has sought, over the objections 
of the plaintiffs, jurisdiction in another court from using the 
BIT to re-litigate the same or similar issues and claims in the 
arbitral process. Second, BIT arbitral panels might benefit from 
bifurcation of jurisdictional and merits-based questions. On this 
point, arbitrators hearing jurisdictional questions must not also 
hear merits questions, and vice-versa, so there is no incentive 
to expand jurisdiction in ways that benefit all. Further, all ques-
tions of jurisdiction should be decided as a threshold matter to 
avoid extended proceedings on the merits that turn out to be 
unnecessary. Finally, just as any public judiciary is held account-
able, it might be useful to consider how BIT arbitrators can be 
monitored to ensure they have the necessary qualifications to 
ensure competent decision making, transparency, and sensitivity 
to affected third party concerns. The pool of candidates should 
be expanded beyond the members of “The Club,” so the same 
arbitrators are not recycled from case to case. In the meantime, 
arbitration rules need to be modified to make the hearings 
public upon the request of any interested party; to permit third 
parties to appear with full rights as parties, including the right 
to appoint an arbitrator, if they can prove a sufficiently strong 
non-protected interest; and to properly incentivize payments to 
arbitrators so they are not motivated for the wrong reasons to 
expand their jurisdiction to the edge of what is permissible.
Whatever the reforms that are needed, this important area 
deserves more scrutiny so that the rule of law can better protect 
human rights litigants and better control investors who seek to 
use abusive litigation tactics. In Aguinda, the Amazon com-
munities will continue fighting for their rights, in whatever 
forum they must. The plaintiffs have filed a motion in the same 
U.S. federal court where they initially filed Aguinda to enjoin 
Chevron from participating in its BIT arbitration on the grounds 
it violates the binding promises the company made to the U.S. 
court to induce dismissal to Ecuador. Even if the BIT arbitration 
is not enjoined and Chevron is granted its ambitious request for 
injunctive relief, the communities will argue that the Ecuadorian 
court can and should disregard the tribunal’s order and reject 
the government’s interference. There is no basis to conclude that 
an arbitral order in favor of Chevron would have a preclusive 
effect on the enforcement of any adverse judgment in another 
country. The plaintiffs plan to move to satisfy any judgment 
against Chevron in any of dozens of countries where the com-
pany maintains substantial assets. The stakes are enormously 
high. For Chevron, the “drown the beast in the bathtub” strategy 
of constant litigation and forum-shopping risks destroying its 
international reputation and ultimately devastating the compa-
ny’s financial picture. For the indigenous groups and rainforest 
communities, it means more years of litigation but also a grow-
ing sense of empowerment to achieve what has always been a 
relatively simple objective — clean-up of their ancestral lands 
and rainforest ecosystem — that seems to be evolving into a 
legal battle with historic ramifications on the global stage. The 
international legal community needs to fully appreciate these 
stakes to move toward a sustainable future in which the rights 
of investors and those of human rights victims are more justly 
balanced.   HRB
Chevron Vice President Ricardo Reis Veiga talks to the press in the 
Superior Court of Justice in Lago Agrio, Ecuador on the first day of 
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1 Texaco merged with Chevron Corp. on Oct. 9, 2001, eight years 
after the plaintiffs filed claims in U.S. federal court. ChevronTexaco 
Corporation (whose name has since changed to “Chevron”) 
announced that it acquired Texaco in a merger transaction while 
the case was ongoing. Press Release, Chevron, ChevronTexaco to 
Begin First Full Day of Global Operations (Oct. 10, 2001) (on file 
with author). Chevron has since defended the Aguinda action.
2 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment on their Counterclaims, Republic 
of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corporation, 376 F. Supp. 2d 334 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 Civ. 8378 LBS) (revealing a fax from 
Mike Kostiw, an official in Texaco’s Federal Government Affairs 
Office, to Texaco officials York LeCorgne and Ricardo Reis Vega 
transmitting an English language “Diplomatic Note, Second 
Draft” stating that “I worked with Amb Teran (Ecuador) on this 
last Friday. He will deliver to the State Department today.”). The 
substantive text of the draft was virtually identical to the letter filed 
in Aguinda. Edgar Teran served as Ecuador’s ambassador to the 
United States from 1992 to 1996.
3 In 2000, lead Ecuadorian attorney for Chevron, Adolfo Callejas, 
provided sworn testimony to the U.S. federal court stating that the 
U.S. judge “should not be concerned about the ability of the courts 
in Ecuador to dispense independent, impartial justice. . . . In none 
of the litigation involving TexPet in Ecuadorian courts have there 
been any allegations of unfairness or corruption.” For copies of 
fourteen affidavits, see ChevronToxico, Examples of Chevron’s 
High Praise of Ecuador’s Courts, http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/
docs/affidavit-packet-part2.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). See also 
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 
473 (2d Cir. 2002).
4 See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Petition 
to Stay Arbitration at 5-6, Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp. 
& Texaco Petroleum Co., No. 09 Civ. 9958 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 
10, 2010) (noting how Texaco, in an effort to induce and ensure 
dismissal of the Aguinda action, unambiguously represented and 
promised, both in a verified interrogatory answer and in repeated 
submissions to the Court, that it would satisfy any ‘final judgment’ 
entered against it in Ecuador defined as a judgment after exhaustion 
of all appeal rights in Ecuador,” subject only to those defenses 
to enforcement provided under the New York’s Recognition of 
Foreign Country Money Judgments Act (“NY Foreign Judgments 
Act”)) (citing Texaco Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its 
Renewed Motions to Dismiss Based on Forum Non Conveniens 
and International Comity at 16-17, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 
F. Supp 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) sub nom. Jota v. Texaco, Inc. 157 
F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (Jan. 11, 1999) (No. 94 Civ. 9266 
(JSR))); Texaco Inc.’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Its 
Renewed Motions to Dismiss Based on Forum Non Conveniens and 
International Comity, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.142 F. Supp 2d 534 
sub nom. Jota v. Texaco, Inc. 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (Jan. 
25, 1999) (93 Civ. 7527 (JSR)) at 21 (Texaco explained it “agreed 
to satisfy any judgments in plaintiffs’ favor, reserving its right to 
contest their validity only in the limited circumstances permitted by 
New York’s Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgment’s Act.”) 
(emphasis added). The NY Foreign Judgments Act allows Chevron 
to raise defenses to avoid enforcement of any adverse judgment 
that might result in the Aguinda lawsuit in Ecuador, including 
mandatory non-enforcement where it can show “the judgment was 
rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals 
or procedures which are compatible with the requirements of due 
process of law.” N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5303 (McKinney 1997).
5 Steven Donziger, Rainforest Chernobyl: Litigating Indigenous 
Rights in Latin America, 11 No. 2 Hum. Rts. BRief 1 (2004).
6 Santiago Cueto, Ecuador Class Action Plaintiffs Strike Back at 
Chevron’s Cynical Game of Musical Jurisdictions, int’L Bus. L. 
aDvisoR, Jan. 18, 2010, http://www.internationalbusinesslawadvisor.
com/2010/01/articles/international-litigation/ecuador-
class-action-plaintiffs-strike-back-at-chevrons-cynical-
game-of-musical-jurisdictions/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2010); 
see also Chevron Missteps: How Not to Handle Foreign 
Litigation, int’L Bus. L. aDvisoR, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.
internationalbusinesslawadvisor.com/2009/09/articles/international-
litigation/chevrons-missteps-how-not-to-handle-foreign-litigation/ 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
7 Chevron, one of the highest-spending lobbyists in D.C., has 
lobbied the U.S. Trade Representative for years to suspend 
Ecuador’s trade preferences unless the government puts an end 
to the Aguinda trial. The trade preferences are estimated to 
provide over 300,000 jobs to the impoverished nation and so 
have been used as a bargaining chip by the corporation against 
the government of Ecuador. See Editorial, Trading With Ecuador: 
Washington Must Resist Efforts by Chevron to Interfere with an 
Andean Trade Agreement, L.a. times, Dec. 3, 2009, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/03/opinion/la-ed-chevron3-
2009dec03; Kenneth Vogel, Chevron’s Lobbying Campaign 
Backfires, PoLitico, Nov. 16, 2009, available at http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/1109/29560.html. In response to recent 
efforts, 26 congressmen joined together urging their colleagues 
not to allow Chevron to use trade preferences as leverage in a 
private litigation. Press Release, Congresswoman Linda Sanchez, 
Members of Congress Urge USTR to Ignore Chevron Petition 
on Ecuador Legal Case (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.
lindasanchez.house.gov/news.cfm/article/595. Though the trade 
preferences were extended in 2009, it provides a strong example 
of how far Chevron is willing to go to undermine the rule of law, 
and improperly influence governmental officials. See infra note 14 
and accompanying text. Additionally, Chevron’s public relations 
firms have taken out numerous advertisements in Ecuadorian 
newspapers attacking the lawyers and judges in the trial as well as 
the independent court expert. See e.g. eL comeRcio newsPaPeR, Oct. 
5, 2006, Feb. 18, 2009, and numerous others (on file with author).
8 See supra note 4.
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